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Abstract 7 
There is a growing interest in the relative benefits to the learner of the different social learning 8 
strategies used to transmit information between conspecifics, and in the extent to which they 9 
require input from individual learning. To date, theoretical models have tended to examine the 10 
success of particular strategies in relation to specific parameters or circumstances. This study 11 
employs individual-based simulations to derive the optimal proportion of individual learning that co-12 
exists with random copying and conformist social learning strategies in populations experiencing 13 
wide-ranging variation in levels of environmental change, reproductive turnover, learning error, and 14 
individual learning costs. Predictions derived from the literature – that optimal levels of individual 15 
learning will be higher for both strategies when the rate of environmental change is higher, and 16 
when reproductive turnover and individual learning costs are lower, are supported. Contrary to the 17 
theoretical prediction, optimal levels of individual learning are sometimes higher under higher levels 18 
of learning error, particularly when reproductive rates are low. Results for the two strategies are 19 
qualitatively similar, but demonstrate numerous parameter combinations under which random 20 
copying is fitter than conformist social learning. Contrary to established expectations, the strategy 21 
employing the lesser proportion of individual learning is not always the fittest. 22 
 23 
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1. Introduction 36 
There is currently considerable interest across a broad range of disciplines in the social learning 37 
strategies that facilitate the transmission of information between conspecifics (e.g Aplin et al. 2015a; 38 
Muthukrishna et al. 2016; Nakahashi et al. 2012). Such research encompasses the development of 39 
theoretical models as well as experimental analyses of numerous species. Two types of social 40 
learning strategy are examined in the current paper: random copying, a baseline strategy in which a 41 
model is selected from the population at random, and ‘conformist’ copying, in which there is a 42 
disproportionate bias towards selecting a common variant as a model (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 43 
1985; Muthukrisha et al. 2016). Of particular importance is the extent to which populations 44 
operating these two strategies will require input from individual learning to facilitate adaptation to 45 
changing environments. Traditionally, theory suggests that social learning avoids the costs (in terms 46 
of time and risk) associated with individual trial-and-error learning, but that its value decreases as 47 
the rate of environmental change increases, as this in turn increases the likelihood that the 48 
information learnt will be out of date (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985). Following a brief review of the 49 
relevant literature on random and conformist social learning strategies, a simulation model is 50 
introduced that allows populations operating each of these two strategies to evolve optimal 51 
proportions of individual learning, and measures the fitness of these optima under variation in a 52 
number of other biologically and culturally relevant parameters. 53 
On a theoretical basis it has been argued (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998) that 54 
because those variants favoured by natural selection will often exist at the highest frequencies in a 55 
pool of potential targets for copying, conformity provides a simple, adaptive social learning rule 56 
under a very broad range of conditions. On this view, conformity provides a cheap shortcut that 57 
prevents individuals having to monitor the performance of conspecifics, as they would have to if 58 
using the various payoff-biased strategies. Other researchers, however, have suggested that 59 
conformity may prevent the spread of beneficial innovations, reducing the cultural diversity of the 60 
population and hindering cumulative cultural evolution (Henrich and Boyd 1998; Eriksson et al. 2007; 61 
Kandler and Laland 2009). The model of Eriksson and colleagues (2007), for example, demonstrates 62 
situations in which a random copying strategy allows for more rapid accumulation of adaptive 63 
innovations that a conformist strategy. If beneficial innovations occur in the population at low 64 
frequency – akin to mutations in the genetic system – then they are likely to be quickly lost in 65 
situations where a strong conformist bias exists. 66 
Since variation provides the raw material on which selection acts (e.g. Price 1970, 1972), the 67 
homogenising effect of conformity could be highly damaging, particularly in changing environments. 68 
A particularly powerful argument concerning the dangers of cultural homogeneity comes from the 69 
work of Whitehead and Richerson (2009).  These authors modelled the evolution of learning 70 
strategies in stochastically fluctuating environments, and found that the low cost of social as 71 
opposed to individual learning in their simulations often led to the elimination of the latter. This 72 
tended to happen during periods of relatively low environmental variation, when the benefits of 73 
individual learning in tracking environmental change were low relative to the costs of the strategy. 74 
The resulting dominance of social learning, however, removed the ability of the population to track 75 
subsequent environmental changes. If such changes were relatively large, populations collapsed due 76 
to their inability to produce novel behaviours. The work of Whitehead and Richerson (2009) is 77 
particularly intriguing in that the environments to which individuals were adapting were 78 
characterised by similar frequency spectra to those found in empirical palaeoclimatic datasets (e.g. 79 
Ditlevsen et al. 1996). Whitehead and Richerson (2009) further note that the only way in which 80 
populations pursuing pure social learning strategies can avoid extinction in their simulations is to 81 
switch to a pay-off based, rather than a conformist, social learning strategy. In a similar vein, Kandler 82 
and Laland (2013) find that as rates of environmental change increase and conformity becomes less 83 
adaptive, the conformist bias must either be weakened or coupled with higher rates of individual 84 
learning (see also Efferson et al. 2008). 85 
Finally, the empirical evidence for conformity is weak (e.g. Eriksson et al. 2007), with empirical 86 
studies hampered by the need to demonstrate positive frequency-dependence. A critical step 87 
forward in the empirical study of social learning has been the recognition that a finding of 88 
frequency-dependence can imply a process of random copying, whereas a finding of positive 89 
frequency-dependence is required to infer a process of conformist copying (e.g. McElreath et al. 90 
2008; though see Acerbi et al. 2016). The logic here is that although copying may be random, a 91 
copier is more likely to copy a variant that exists in the population at high frequency because she is 92 
more likely to be exposed to such a variant (or, equivalently, she will be exposed to such a variant 93 
more often). Frequency-dependence is depicted by the blue line in Figure 1; note that frequencies 94 
before and after learning are equal (on average) under frequency-dependent copying.  The red line 95 
in Figure 1 depicts positive frequency-dependence, under which high-frequency variants increase in 96 
frequency after learning, with low-frequency variants decreasing. In order to infer a process of 97 
conformity, empirical studies must demonstrate a sigmoid curve similar to the red line in Figure 1, 98 
with proportions of variants changing due to social learning through time. 99 
Where evidence for conformity appears robust, a simple ‘copy the majority’ rule provides greatest 100 
explanatory power (e.g. Aplin et al. 2015a; Pike and Laland 2010; Morgan et al. 2012). Kandler and 101 
Laland (2009:65) argue on theoretical grounds that “strong conformity is unlikely to be widespread 102 
in human culture”, whilst Eriksson and colleagues (2007) suggest that there is no satisfactory 103 
evidence that a conformist bias exists in human social learning. Nonetheless, there remains a 104 
conviction, rooted in the human psychology literature of the early twentieth century (e.g. Jenness 105 
1932; Sherif 1936; Asch 1956), that conformity is a powerful force in human social learning. There 106 
has also been considerable research into conformity in other species, ranging from primates (e.g. 107 
Dindo et al. 2009; Whiten et al. 2005; Hopper et al. 2011; van de Waal et al. 2013) to rats (e.g. Galef 108 
and Whiskin 2008), birds (e.g. Rosa et al. 2012; Aplin et al. 2015a), and fish (e.g. Pike and Laland 109 
2010). 110 
Pike and Laland (2010) demonstrated that nine-spined sticklebacks given a choice of two feeders 111 
chose the one at which they had witnessed the majority of conspecifics feeding, despite having 112 
earlier learnt by experience that the feeder in this position dispensed less food than the other. 113 
Crucially, the number of fish choosing to neglect their individually learned preference in favour of 114 
copying others increased disproportionately as the size of the majority being copied increased. Aplin 115 
and colleagues (2015a) captured wild great tits and trained them to feed from a puzzle box by 116 
opening a door with their bill from either the left or the right of the box. Differently trained 117 
individuals were then released into different areas, and their conspecifics rapidly learnt from them 118 
how to open the puzzle boxes placed in their habitats. Naive birds in each area copied the solution 119 
learned by the trained individuals released there, with subsequent adoption based 120 
disproportionately on the local majority strategy. Importantly, even birds exposed to both solutions 121 
continued to display the local majority strategy, and of birds that relocated to areas with different 122 
strategies, 71% altered their behaviour so as to conform in the new location. These studies are 123 
highly persuasive of the presence of conformist social learning, yet an active debate continues as to 124 
the presence of possible confounds and the possibility of alternative, more parsimonious 125 
explanations (e.g. van Leeuwen and Haun 2014; Aplin et al. 2015b; van Leeuwen et al. 2015, 2016; 126 
Acerbi et al. 2016; Whiten and van der Waal 2016). 127 
Random copying, the second strategy examined here, has also received considerable attention from 128 
behavioural biologists. Slater and colleagues (1980:210), for example, suggest that different song 129 
types among chaffinches are selectively neutral, appearing to “arise and be lost from the population 130 
at random, without the transmission of some being favoured over that of others”. Similarly, Hahn 131 
and Bentley (2003) find that the distribution of baby names in the United States over a 100-year 132 
period can be explained by a process analogous to genetic drift, with parents randomly copying 133 
names from others. An important element of this pattern is what they refer to as ‘proportional 134 
sampling’; parents are more likely to be exposed to, and therefore more likely to copy, names that 135 
are already popular. This phenomenon, more often referred to as frequency-dependence, is 136 
equivalent to random copying; copying is random, but conditioned on the frequency of stimuli that 137 
the subject is exposed to. A critical step forward in the empirical study of social learning has been 138 
the recognition that a finding of frequency dependence can imply a process of random copying, 139 
whereas a finding of positive frequency dependence is required to infer a process of conformist 140 
copying (e.g. McElreath et al. 2008; though see Acerbi et al. 2016). Finally, in an expansion of the 141 
techniques employed by Hahn and Bentley (2003), Herzog and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that 142 
the popularity of purebred dogs in the United States over a 50-year period fluctuated in a manner 143 
consistent with random copying, though with some identified anomalies. 144 
The above examples reflect situations in which there are no apparent fitness differences between 145 
the available variants; as no variant is ‘fitter’ than any other, choices reflect varied individual 146 
motivations and preferences that, when aggregated, appear random at the population scale. 147 
Archaeologists have long attempted to divide material culture traits into those that are subject to 148 
natural selection and those that have no impact on fitness and are thus likely to vary in frequency in 149 
random fashion (e.g. Dunnell 1978; Neiman 1995; Custer 2001; Shennan and Wilkinson 2001; 150 
Brantigham 2007). In particular, Dunnell’s (1978) distinction between stylistic and functional 151 
elements expresses this dichotomy, though it should be noted that stylistic elements often have a 152 
social function that may ultimately contribute to an individual’s fitness. Archaeological examples of 153 
apparently random copying of stylistic traits have been found in studies of Woodland period 154 
ceramics from Illinois (Neiman 1995) and decorative band types on pottery from Neolithic 155 
settlements in western Germany (Shennan and Wilkinson 2001; Bentley and Shennan 2003).  156 
It is relatively easy to appreciate how fitness-neutral or stylistic traits could come to be copied at 157 
random, but harder to imagine a similar mechanism operating on the transmission of fitness-158 
conferring traits. In certain circumstances, however, the latter can indeed occur. Tanaka and 159 
colleagues (2009) demonstrate that the maintenance and transmission of various complementary 160 
and alternative medical practices between individuals does not depend on the efficacy of those 161 
practices. These authors show that superstitious treatments with no medical benefit, and even 162 
maladaptive practices that harm their users, can be retained at relatively high frequencies. Whilst a 163 
demonstration that treatments are not copied on the basis of their efficacy alone is not sufficient to 164 
demonstrate random copying, the authors also develop a model of random copying that adequately 165 
describes the empirical pattern. It appears that in this case individuals attempt to acquire effective 166 
treatments, but often fail to do so due to cultural biases and the difficulties of accurately assessing 167 
the relative performance of any given treatment (Tanaka et al. 2009). The aggregate pattern that 168 
results thus resembles random copying. 169 
There are a number of important reasons for comparing random and conformist copying. Firstly, 170 
Tanaka and colleagues (2009:7) make the important point that the assumption of random copying in 171 
their model is “simple and parsimonious”. Whilst they do not elaborate on this point, random 172 
copying can be seen as parsimonious both in terms of time and in terms of the cognitive demands 173 
that it places on the learner. Random copying requires the learner to copy only a single conspecific, 174 
whereas conformist copying implies the ability to monitor the behaviour of multiple individuals such 175 
that the majority behaviour can be accurately discerned. Secondly, random copying is an 176 
appropriate baseline condition for the study of all social learning strategies; such ‘unbiased’ copying 177 
is the essential null model against which all other learning strategies should be tested. Finally, since 178 
random copying equates to frequency-dependence and conformist copying equates to positive 179 
frequency-dependence, this comparison is particularly germane; it is not unreasonable to postulate 180 
that conformist transmission, where it exists, has evolved from an ancestral pattern of random 181 
copying. 182 
The model introduced below employs individual-based simulations to derive the optimal proportion 183 
of individual learning that co-exists with random copying and conformist or ‘copy the majority’ 184 
strategies (henceforth CR and CtM) in populations experiencing differing levels of environmental 185 
change, reproductive turnover, learning error, and individual learning costs. The model allows for 186 
rigorous testing of a number of expectations and hypotheses gleaned from the literature surveyed 187 
above (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985; Efferson et al. 2008; Lewis and Laland 2012; Nakahashi et al. 188 
2012) under variation in a wider set of parameters than has been employed in any previous single 189 
study. Through a distillation of previous results, it is predicted that levels of individual learning will 190 
be higher for both strategies when: 191 
 The rate of environmental change is higher; 192 
 Reproductive turnover is lower; 193 
 Learning error is higher; 194 
 Costs of individual learning are lower. 195 
Given the difficulty of identifying conformist transmission in natural systems, an important goal of 196 
the model is to identify those conditions under which this strategy is likely to be fitter than random 197 
copying. Finally, as the proportions of individual learning and fitness are the two principal outputs 198 
produced here, the model also provides an ideal opportunity to test the hypothesis (Kendal et al. 199 
2009) that: 200 
 The fittest social learning strategy will be that which requires the lowest proportion of 201 
individual learning under a given set of conditions. 202 
2. Methods 203 
An evolutionary individual-based model was developed in which a population evolves the optimal 204 
proportion of individual learning under a comprehensive set of parameter combinations; the 205 
following model description follows the ODD protocol (Grimm et al. 2010). 206 
 Purpose. The main purpose of the model is to examine differences in the proportions of 207 
individual learning that evolve in populations whose social learning strategy is either random 208 
copying (CR)  or a conformist ‘copy the majority’ strategy (CtM). Populations using these two 209 
social learning strategies are simulated separately. Rate of environmental change ( ), 210 
learning error ( ), reproductive rate ( ), and the cost of individual learning ( ) are varied 211 
systematically to examine their effects on the proportion of individual learning that evolves 212 
under the two social learning strategies. 213 
 Entities, state variables, and scales. The environment is simulated as a symmetrical sawtooth 214 
wave that varies in amplitude between simulations. The entities of the model are asexually 215 
reproducing individuals that socially learn via either CR or CtM. Each individual is described 216 
by three variables: a behavioural phenotype, a proportion of individual learning, and a 217 
fitness score. The proportion of individual learning is the only inherited trait of an individual; 218 
the behavioural phenotype is learned anew each iteration and the fitness score is 219 
determined by how close the phenotype is to the environmental value in a given iteration. 220 
The behavioural phenotype and the environment are measured on the same continuous 221 
scale. The behavioural phenotype is updated at the start of each iteration through learning. 222 
The proportion of individual learning,  , determines the extent to which the individual 223 
depends on individual learning as opposed to social learning via either CR or CtM. 224 
The reproductive rate,                , determines what proportion of the population is 225 
replaced each iteration; generations are therefore overlapping in the simulations considered 226 
here, with the average lifetime of an individual being     iterations. The cost of individual 227 
learning,               , reflects the time taken to independently establish a behaviour 228 
and the risk of injury potentially associated with doing so, and is implemented during 229 
evaluation of the fitness function (see Reproduction, below). The rate of environmental 230 
change,             , reflects the wide range of environmental conditions encountered 231 
by many animals on often relatively short timescales. Finally, learning error,             , 232 
reflects the fact that learning targets, via either individual or social learning, are unlikely to 233 
be perfectly met. Simulations, each of 6,000 iterations, were run separately for the two 234 
social learning strategies (CR and CtM), and for each combination of  ,  ,  , and  , yielding 235 
7,938 simulated combinations. Each simulation was run with a fixed population size of   = 236 
500 individuals. 237 
 Process overview and scheduling. At birth, individuals inherit from their parent a value that 238 
determines the proportion of individual learning they will engage in. This value is slightly 239 
mutated relative to that of the parent (see ‘Mutation’ below). A learning error ( ) applies to 240 
both individual and social learning (see ‘Learning’ below). After learning, the fitness of each 241 
individual,  , is evaluated according to a Gaussian function that takes into account the cost 242 
of individual learning. Reproduction then takes place via fitness-proportionate selection (see 243 
‘Reproduction’ below), with new individuals inheriting only the (mutated)   values of their 244 
parents. Prior to the start of the next iteration, the value of the most common phenotype 245 
among the survivors is recorded so that it can act as the target for social learning amongst 246 
conformist (CtM) individuals in the next iteration. At the same stage,     phenotypes from 247 
among the       survivors are randomly sampled with replacement; each one of these 248 
phenotypes will act as a target for social learning for one of the CR individuals in the next 249 
iteration. Median values of the proportion of individual learning,  , and fitness,  , in the 250 
population of agents are recorded at the end of each iteration. The above schedule then 251 
begins again. 252 
 Design concepts. The outputs of the model are the proportions of individual learning,  , and 253 
fitness,  , in populations employing the two social learning strategies (CR and CtM) under 254 
various combinations of values of the four input variables  ,  ,  , and  . Given these outputs, 255 
it can be simply determined which strategy employs more individual learning, and which 256 
strategy is fitter, for any combination of the four input variables. Changes in   through time 257 
emerge from the combined effects of heredity, mutation, differential survival, and 258 
differential reproduction, given the values of the four input variables. Mutation, survival 259 
probability, probability of reproduction, and both individual and social learning are affected 260 
by stochastic variation. The environment has a constant absolute first derivative (i.e. it 261 
changes at a constant rate) during each of the 6,000 iterations of any given simulation; the 262 
principal results are therefore given as the median values of   and   in the population over 263 
the last 5,000 iterations of the simulation (the first 1,000 iterations are discarded). 264 
 Initialization. Simulations were initialized with an environmental value of zero. Initial 265 
phenotype values were drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a 266 
standard deviation of 0.05. Initial proportions of individual learning were drawn from a 267 
uniform distribution on the interval [0,0.1]; differences in these starting values did not affect 268 
the outcomes of the simulations. 269 
 Input. The model does not have any external inputs. 270 
 Submodels 271 
 Environment. The environment is a symmetrical sawtooth wave. This waveform was chosen 272 
because it has constant absolute first derivative (i.e. the rate of environmental change is a 273 
constant) and because, though simple, it captures the periodicity found in empirical 274 
(palaeo)climatic data. The rate of environmental change per iteration ( ) is varied between 275 
simulations in increments of 0.05 from 0 to 1 by increasing the amplitude of the wave in 276 
increments of 2.5 from 0 to 25. Experiments demonstrated that altering   via the period 277 
rather than the amplitude of the wave did not affect the results. 278 
 Learning. At the start of each iteration, all individuals update their behavioural phenotype 279 
via a combination of social and individual learning, as determined by their inherited value of 280 
 . Each individual   learns a behavioural phenotype,   , in iteration   as 281 
                                    [1] 282 
Where   is the proportion of individual learning,   is a value obtained via individual learning 283 
and   is a value obtained via social learning, with the subscript         indicating the 284 
social learning strategy followed (either CR or CtM). An individual aiming for a given target, 285 
through either social or individual learning, will achieve a result drawn from a normal 286 
distribution with that target as its mean and the learning error value,  , as its standard 287 
deviation. The target for individual learning is the environment in the current iteration, 288 
    , whereas the target for social learning is the majority phenotypic value from the 289 
previous iteration (CtM) or a randomly sampled phenotype from the previous iteration (CR). 290 
 Reproduction. The fitness of each individual,   , is evaluated according to a Gaussian 291 
function with a mean equal to the current environmental value,    , and unit variance, 292 
                                       
       [2] 293 
where   is the cost of individual learning. Simulations are run with                . The 294 
least fit     individuals are then removed from the population and replaced by     295 
offspring of individuals chosen by fitness-proportionate selection from among the       296 
survivors, where       is population size and                 is the proportion of the 297 
population replaced each iteration. New individuals inherit only the (mutated)   values of 298 
their parents. 299 
 Mutation. Offspring inherit a value determining the proportion of individual learning they 300 
engage in; however, this value undergoes mutation as it is transmitted from parent to 301 
offspring. Mutation is carried out via a multiplicative lognormal operator of the form 302 
           , where    is the value of   after mutation and   is a value called from a 303 
normal distribution with mean zero and a standard deviation of 0.05. The lognormal 304 
operator ensures that the proportion of individual learning can never be <0; to ensure that it 305 
is never >1, mutated values that are >1 are reset to equal 1. 306 
 Targets for social learning. At the end of each iteration the value of the most common 307 
phenotype and a random sample with replacement of     phenotypes from the parent 308 
population are recorded; these values are used as the targets of social learning in the next 309 
iteration for the CtM and CR strategies respectively. The most common phenotype is 310 
necessarily calculated via a binning procedure: as phenotypic values are recorded at high 311 
precision a simple calculation of the modal value is insufficient, as it is unlikely (even in large 312 
populations) that any two individuals’ phenotypic values will be exactly the same. Surviving 313 
phenotypes are therefore assigned to              bins of equal width covering the range 314 
of values in a given iteration (following Scott 1979); the most common phenotypic value is 315 
considered to occur at the mid-point of the bin containing the greatest number of 316 
phenotypes. 317 
The model was implemented in Matlab R2017a (MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA); model code is 318 
included as supplementary file CSR_SM4_Model_Code.txt, and figure construction code as 319 
supplementary files CSR_SM1_FigType1.txt, CSR_SM2_FigType2.txt, and CSR_SM3_FigType3.txt. 320 
3. Results 321 
Results are reported below for evolved proportions of individual learning, and for the fitness of the 322 
resulting optima; each subsection begins with a report of trends common to both strategies before 323 
proceeding to report important differences between them. 324 
3.1. Proportions of individual learning 325 
3.1.1. General trends 326 
As predicted, the evolved level of individual learning is higher in situations in which the rate of 327 
environmental change is higher. This can be seen from plots of the proportion of individual learning 328 
that evolves under the various conditions considered, provided here for random copying in Figure 2 329 
and for conformist copying in Figure 3. As one would expect, individual learning declines as its cost 330 
increases. Increases in the cost of individual learning, however, lead to only quantitative changes; in 331 
a given column of figures, each figure above depicts a magnification of the lowest part of the figure 332 
below it. This suggests that the existence of a greater cost to individual than social learning is more 333 
important than the magnitude of that cost in producing general patterns in the model. 334 
As predicted, higher rates of reproduction lead to lower levels of individual learning, as 335 
demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3. An interesting trade-off emerges, however, between reproductive 336 
rate and learning error. At high reproductive rates (  = 0.9), a high learning error leads to a reduction 337 
in individual learning; at low reproductive rates (  = 0.1), by contrast, a high learning error can lead 338 
to an increase in individual learning, provided the rate of environmental change is sufficiently low. 339 
This partially conflicts with the basic theoretical prediction that levels of individual learning will be 340 
higher when learning error is lower, and is therefore discussed further below. 341 
3.1.2. Comparisons between strategies 342 
In general, Figures 2 and 3 appear very similar, with proportions of individual learning not differing 343 
considerably between the two strategies. On closer inspection, however, higher levels of individual 344 
learning evolve under random copying in a broad region around the positive diagonal (indicating 345 
equality of environmental change and learning error) when reproductive rates are low, under almost 346 
all conditions when reproductive rates are intermediate, and when learning error is lower than the 347 
rate of environmental change when reproductive rates are high. This can be seen from Figure 4, 348 
which facilitates comparison by providing a simple dichotomous representation, with cells coloured 349 
black when random copying evolves a higher proportion of individual learning, and white otherwise. 350 
Again, it is clear that the cost of individual learning makes only minor differences to the outcome, 351 
with these differences having most effect when reproductive rates are low. The ‘chequerboard’ 352 
effect, seen for example in the upper left regions of all three plots under high reproductive rates, 353 
demonstrates that differences between the levels of individual learning under the two strategies are 354 
marginal, representing merely stochastic variation. It is only with low reproductive rates that 355 
considerable regions of the plots show higher levels of individual learning evolving under conformist 356 
transmission. At low costs of individual learning these appear primarily where learning error is high 357 
relative to environmental change; when learning costs are high, however, such regions also appear 358 
where learning error is low relative to environmental change.  359 
3.2. Fitness 360 
3.2.1. General trends 361 
As predicted, higher fitness occurs at lower learning costs for both strategies, as can be seen for 362 
random copying in Figure 5 and for conformist copying in Figure 6. Fitness declines as the rate of 363 
environmental change increases; highest fitness occurs in all cases when environmental change is 364 
very low and learning error is low to moderate. Regions of high fitness are larger under higher 365 
reproductive rates in all cases, and a line demarcating a sharp distinction between regions of high 366 
and low fitness is clear, particularly when both reproductive rates and costs of individual learning are 367 
high. This line depicts a positive relationship between environmental change and learning error, 368 
though the slope of the line varies, being lower at higher reproductive rates. 369 
3.2.2. Comparisons between strategies 370 
Overall, higher levels of fitness evolve under conformity when learning error is lower than the rate of 371 
environmental change when reproductive rates are low, under almost all conditions when 372 
reproductive rates are intermediate, and in a broad region around the positive diagonal (indicating 373 
equality of environmental change and learning error) when reproductive rates are high. This can be 374 
seen from Figure 7, which provides a comparison of the results of Figures 5 and 6, with cells 375 
coloured black when random copying is fitter, and white otherwise. 376 
The regions in which random copying is fitter are affected more by reproductive rate than by the 377 
costs of individual learning. When reproductive rate is low, random copying is fitter only in a region 378 
where learning error is higher than the rate of environmental change, with the size of this region 379 
declining as the cost of individual learning increases. Under moderate reproductive rates, a minimal 380 
region in which random copying is fitter occurs when learning error is much higher than the rate of 381 
environmental change. Random copying is also fitter in a very small region in which learning error is 382 
very low and environmental change is moderate to high, a pattern expanded under high 383 
reproductive rates. At high reproductive rates there are two clearly demarked regions in which 384 
random copying is fitter: these occur (1) when learning error is considerably higher than the rate of 385 
environmental change, and (2) when learning error is considerably lower than the rate of 386 
environmental change. 387 
Taken in conjunction with the results for individual learning, above, these results demonstrate a very 388 
broad accordance with the proposal of Kendal and colleagues (2009) that the fittest strategy will be 389 
that which can persist with the lowest proportion of individual learning. To examine this proposal in 390 
more detail, Figure 8 shows a plot in which cells are coloured: 391 
 Black if both individual  learning and fitness are higher under conformist learning; 392 
 Red if individual learning is higher and fitness is lower under conformist learning; 393 
 Green if individual learning is lower and fitness is higher under conformist learning, and; 394 
 White if both individual learning and fitness are lower under conformist learning. 395 
In this situation, cells coloured green and red are in agreement with the conjecture of Kendal and 396 
colleagues (2009), whilst cells coloured white and black oppose this conjecture. As can be seen from 397 
Figure 8, there are several regions in which black and white cells appear, suggesting that this 398 
conjecture is not supported under all conditions. If ‘chequerboard’ regions are disregarded, white 399 
cells appear primarily at low reproductive rates, particularly when rates of environmental change are 400 
high relative to learning error; this pattern is particularly pronounced under higher costs of 401 
individual learning. Black cells appear primarily in the same regions, but at high reproductive rates. 402 
This suggests that at low reproductive rates random copying strategies can be fitter despite 403 
employing a greater proportion of individual learning, whilst at high reproductive rates conformist 404 
strategies can be fitter despite higher levels of individual learning. 405 
4. Discussion 406 
The key to explaining the patterns of Figure 8 lies first in noting that the cost of individual learning is 407 
a model parameter; it is therefore equal for both strategies in any given comparison. The benefits of 408 
individual learning, therefore, must differ between strategies in those cells coloured either black or 409 
white in Figure 8. Both white regions (at low reproductive rates) and black regions (at high 410 
reproductive rates) are immediately adjacent to red regions in which individual learning is higher but 411 
fitness is lower under conformity. The transition from red to white therefore represents a change in 412 
relative proportions of individual learning between the two strategies, whilst the transition from red 413 
to black represents a change in relative fitness between the two strategies. A possible explanation 414 
for this pattern is that individual learning with error rates lower than rates of environmental change 415 
is more beneficial to random copiers at low reproductive rates because it enables them to better 416 
track the environment. Conversely, a similar situation under high reproductive rates is more 417 
beneficial to conformists because it allows them to maintain variation in their populations. 418 
It should be reiterated that the comparison made in these simulations is between random copying 419 
and strict conformity (i.e. ‘copy the most common variant’). A benefit of random copying is that it is 420 
more likely to maintain variation in the population than is conformity. Strict conformity will 421 
automatically purge the population of rare innovations due simply to their rarity, even in cases 422 
where those innovations are beneficial. More broadly, the more ‘positive’ positive frequency-423 
dependence becomes, the more likely it will be to remove innovations, which by definition appear at 424 
low frequencies. At high reproductive rates, therefore, there is a very real possibility of a conformist 425 
population becoming dangerously homogenous, and individual learning is required to maintain 426 
variation (see Whitehead and Richerson 2009). This is likely to explain why individual learning is 427 
more beneficial to conformists in the black areas of Figure 8. 428 
By contrast, a considerable cost of random copying is that it has only a weak ability to track 429 
environmental change. Boyd and Richerson (1985) suggested that conformity could provide a means 430 
of tracking environmental change because natural selection will ensure that the commonest variants 431 
in the population are also the most common. Random copying, which is ultimately equivalent to 432 
frequency-dependent copying, will lead to a qualitatively similar but much weaker result, meaning 433 
that individual learning has an important effect in allowing random copiers to track a changing 434 
environment. The need for individual learning at low reproductive rates will be particularly pressing 435 
for random copiers, since the effects of natural selection in tracking environmental change – which 436 
are already weak compared to those for conformists - will become even less effective. This 437 
potentially explains why individual learning is more beneficial to random copiers in the white regions 438 
of Figure 8. Overall, the hypothesis of Kendal and colleagues (2009) – which is intuitively appealing – 439 
requires further testing that considers both the benefits and the costs of individual learning, and 440 
how these might differ between different social learning strategies in a given set of circumstances. 441 
Of the generic predictions made above (Section 1) regarding levels of individual learning, most are 442 
supported: levels of individual learning are higher when rates of environmental change are higher, 443 
and when reproductive rates and the costs of individual learning are lower. The prediction that 444 
levels of individual learning would be higher when learning error is lower, however, was partially 445 
contradicted. At low reproductive rates, levels of individual learning were found to be higher under 446 
higher levels of learning error. This result is explained by the fact that learning error is the same for 447 
both social and individual learners in the model, and that, contrary to established theory, high error 448 
rates can sometimes be more detrimental to social learners than individual learners. 449 
Under individual learning, the target for learning is the value of the environment in the current 450 
iteration – the same value against which fitness will be assessed. Increasing the learning error is 451 
therefore always detrimental to individual learners, as it can only result in phenotypes that are on 452 
average further from this optimum. The learning target for social learners is the phenotype of a 453 
surviving member of the population, who may already be some distance from the optimum due to 454 
environmental change. As learning error is represented as a univariate, Gaussian distribution 455 
centred on this learning target, on average half the variation it creates will be in the ‘wrong’ 456 
direction, and therefore half of social learners will acquire phenotypes that are less fit than those of 457 
their targets. When learning error is high relative to the rate of environmental change, however, 458 
there will also be a proportion of social learners who acquire phenotypes that are too far in the 459 
‘correct’ direction, and are also therefore less fit than those of their targets. This situation is 460 
depicted in Figure 9a. Assuming that the target being copied by a social learner achieved exactly the 461 
optimum during the previous iteration, the probability of learning error   resulting in a phenotype 462 
that is better than the target of social learning under rate of environmental change   is given by use 463 
of the normal cumulative density function 464 
       
        
 
    
  
   
   
  
  
              [3] 465 
This function is plotted over the range of   and   used in the simulations in Figure 9b. Note that this 466 
probability declines to very low levels for    , leading to a compensatory increase in individual 467 
learning when this situation pertains in populations with low reproductive rates. At high 468 
reproductive rates, by contrast, natural selection is far more able to capitalise on the phenotypic 469 
variance created by high learning error, reproducing multiple copies of variants that happen to 470 
achieve high fitness and discarding the remainder. 471 
Having explored the results presented above, it is important here to consider the limitations of the 472 
model, including the effects of relaxing the assumptions made, as well as to highlight possible 473 
modifications and extensions. As the model presented here parameterises a greater number of 474 
variables it necessarily makes fewer assumptions than previous models, but it remains important to 475 
consider the effects of those assumptions. In particular, the paragraphs below consider the 476 
assumptions that learning errors are equal for social and individual learners and that different social 477 
learning strategies entail the same costs; the wider applicability of results gained from the use of a 478 
simple model environment and the possible effects of relaxing the assumption of strict conformity 479 
are also considered. 480 
A number of possible extensions relate to the assumed structure of costs imposed on the individuals 481 
in the model. Whilst the model varies the cost of individual learning, and ensures that it is always 482 
higher than that for social learning, it assumes that the learning error is identical for individual and 483 
social learning. This is the most sensible baseline assumption, but it may be that social learning, as 484 
the ‘cheaper’ means of modifying behaviour, has been optimised in different ways, and has in fact 485 
been subject to different selective pressures, than individual learning. This will depend on the nature 486 
of the social system, the availability of opportunities for social learning, and the ease with which 487 
behavioural modification can be achieved via this route. It may be useful in future work to 488 
parameterize individual and social learning errors as separate variables, provided this can be done 489 
via recourse to empirical findings. 490 
Further to this, there is a logical argument for suggesting that the social learning strategies 491 
themselves may entail different costs. Boyd and Richerson (1985), for example, suggest that 492 
conformity is a relatively cheap strategy in that it requires learners to monitor only the prevalence of 493 
behaviours in the population rather than the success of those behaviours. This logic was designed to 494 
show a possible benefit of conformist social learning over a payoff-based strategy, but the logic can 495 
be further extended to cover random copying. The costs of monitoring conspecifics are likely to be 496 
of two kinds: the time invested, which could otherwise have been utilised performing alternative 497 
activities, and the cognitive demands of keeping track of either the prevalence of the success of 498 
various behaviours at the group or population level. Both types of cost are minimised by random 499 
copying: a model is selected at random, based perhaps on proximity or simply on exposure, and 500 
there is no need to monitor individuals beyond the selected model. We might therefore reasonably 501 
posit that, in terms of strategy costs, random < conformist < payoff-based. If this scheme is accurate, 502 
it would suggest that the results presented above are conservative with respect to the conditions 503 
under which random copying is favoured, since neither the time nor the cognitive costs feature in 504 
the model. 505 
To ensure results are relatively easy to interpret in relation to rates of environmental change, the 506 
model presented here assumes a simple saw-tooth environment with a constant absolute first 507 
derivative (i.e. a constant rate of environmental change per iteration). Although this represents an 508 
increase in realism over some previous models, such an environment is of course unlikely to occur in 509 
nature, and it will therefore be important to consider the effects of more realistically varying 510 
environments in future studies. It is suggested here, however, that the mean of the rate of change 511 
may be a key variable determining both the optimal balance of individual and social learning and the 512 
relative fitness of the various social learning strategies available. The mean rate of environmental 513 
change is easily calculated from any quantifiable empirical time series, allowing empirical data to be 514 
directly related to the theoretical results presented above. Further theoretical investigations are 515 
required, however, as by analogy with palaeoclimatic studies (e.g. Grove 2014, 2017) both the 516 
variance of the rate of change and the autocorrelation of the time series may also affect selection on 517 
learning strategies. A promising avenue for research in this area is provided by Whitehead (2007; see 518 
also Whitehead and Richerson 2009), who uses coloured noises in the white to red spectrum as 519 
model environments. As coloured noises have an easily explicable autocorrelation structure, closely 520 
approximate real palaeoclimatic time series, and can be scaled to have equal means and variances, 521 
they offer condiserable promise as synthetic environments for future models of the kind presented 522 
above (Grove in prep). 523 
Finally, it would be useful in future applications of the above model to relax the assumption of strict 524 
conformity. Kandler and Laland (2013), for example, found a positive relationship between the 525 
strength of conformity and the proportion of individual learning required. This is an intriguing 526 
conclusion, suggesting that conformity may only be a dominant strategy when it is relatively weak 527 
(i.e. when positive frequency-dependence is only moderately positive). Since weak conformity is a 528 
strategy on the spectrum between random copying and strict conformity, this result has a direct 529 
bearing on the model presented above. As discussed above, strict conformity can eliminate 530 
beneficial innovations, whereas random copying can fail to adequately track a changing 531 
environment. Weak conformity may therefore achieve and optimal balance between these two 532 
endpoints, and a useful modelling enterprise would involve allowing the strength of conformity itself 533 
to evolve in a model similar that implemented above. 534 
5. Conclusions 535 
The model developed above allows populations to evolve optimal levels of individual learning under 536 
variation in rate of environmental change, learning error, reproductive rate, and the costs of 537 
individual learning, and records the fitness achieved at these optima. This enabled comparison of 538 
results for two social learning strategies: random copying, and conformist copying. Predictions 539 
derived from the literature – that levels of individual learning will be higher for both strategies when 540 
the rate of environmental change is higher, and when reproductive turnover and individual learning 541 
costs are lower, were supported for both strategies. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, evolved 542 
levels of individual learning were sometimes higher under higher learning errors, particularly when 543 
reproductive rates were low. This demonstrates that situations exist in which high learning error is 544 
more detrimental to social learning than to individual learning. Results for both proportions of 545 
individual learning and fitness for the two strategies were qualitatively similar, and demonstrated a 546 
number of regions in which random copying was the fitter strategy. Contrary to expectations, the 547 
strategy employing the lesser proportion of individual learning was not always the fittest, suggesting 548 
that the benefits of individual learning differ for the two strategies under particular sets of 549 
circumstances. 550 
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Figures 699 
Figure 1. The distinction between frequency-dependence (FD, blue line) and positive frequency-700 
dependence (Positive FD, red line). FD is indicative of random copying, whereas Positive FD is 701 
indicative of conformist social learning. Note that only under Positive FD do changes in the 702 
proportions of variants occur during social learning. 703 
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Figure 2. Evolved proportions of individual learning in conjunction with a random copying strategy 719 
under variation in rate of environmental change, learning error, reproductive rate and cost of 720 
individual learning. Note that the single colourbar indexes values in all nine plots. 721 
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Figure 3. Evolved proportions of individual learning in conjunction with a conformist copying 732 
strategy under variation in rate of environmental change, learning error, reproductive rate and cost 733 
of individual learning. Note that the single colourbar indexes values in all nine plots. 734 
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Figure 4. Comparison of evolved proportions of individual learning under random and conformist 745 
strategies. Cells are coloured back if random copying results in a greater proportion of individual 746 
learning than conformist copying, and white otherwise. 747 
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Figure 5. Fitness of the random copying strategy under variation in rate of environmental change, 757 
learning error, reproductive rate and cost of individual learning. Note that the single colourbar 758 
indexes values in all nine plots. 759 
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Figure 6. Fitness of the conformist copying strategy under variation in rate of environmental change, 770 
learning error, reproductive rate and cost of individual learning. Note that the single colourbar 771 
indexes values in all nine plots. 772 
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Figure 7. Comparison of fitness under random and conformist strategies. Cells are coloured back if 784 
random copying results in higher fitness than conformist copying, and white otherwise. 785 
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Figure 8. Joint comparison of proportion of individual learning (IL) and fitness (F) under random and 796 
conformist strategies. Cells are coloured: back if both IL and F are higher under conformity; red if IL 797 
is higher and F is lower under conformity; green if IL is lower and F is higher under conformity; white 798 
if both IL and F are lower under conformity. 799 
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Figure 9. Effects of learning error on social learning. a) the target of social learning is at 0, but the 809 
environment has since changed by an amount  . Given a learning error which is high relative to  , 810 
learning error creates two situations in which the copy of the target can be further from the current 811 
environment than is the target itself (shaded regions). Half the copies will have moved in the ‘wrong’ 812 
direction, whilst a small proportion will have moved too far in the ‘correct’ direction (i.e. beyond 2 ). 813 
a) a rendering of equation [3] over the parameter values of environmental change and learning error 814 
used in the simulations, demonstrating that the probability of achieving a copy that is better than 815 
the target for social learning is lowest when environmental change is low and learning error is high. 816 
 817 
